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     ABSTRACT 
 
 
The use of complex and sophisticated financial instruments, such as derivatives, in the 
modern financial environment, has triggered the emergence of new forms of risks. As well as 
the need to manage such types of risks, this paper investigates developments which have 
instigated the Basel Committee in developing advanced risk management techniques such as 
the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approaches and the Advanced Measurement Approaches 
(AMA). Developments since the inception of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord have not only led 
to growing realisation that new forms of risks have emerged, but that previously existing and 
managed forms require further redress. Basel II has evolved to a form of meta regulation – a 
type of regulation which involves the risk management of internal risk within firms. This 
paper attempts to illustrate the extent to which the Basel II Capital Accord has responded to 
global and financial developments and concludes on the basis of available research evidence, 
that given the difficulties attributed to the constantly evolving nature of risk and the need for 
regulators to remain one step ahead, that Basel II, to an extent, has been responsive in 
meeting with regulatory demands. However, the existence of unregulated instruments such as 
hedge funds still implies that, despite its advancements and achievements, the Basel 
Committee still faces uphill challenges in its efforts to address and regulate risks.  
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The Responsive Approach by the Basel Committee (on Banking 
Supervision) to Regulation: Meta Risk Regulation, the Internal Ratings 
Based Approaches and the Advanced Measurement Approaches. 
 
     Marianne Ojo1      
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Meta regulation “with its collaborative approach to rule generation”, it has been argued2, 
could controversially be considered as the approach with greatest evolvement when compared 
with other regulatory approaches. Meta risk regulation involves the risk management of 
internal risk and the ability to implement firms’ own internal risk management systems in 
achieving regulatory objectives.3 The Basel II Capital Accord is an illustration of the 
operation of meta regulation owing to the fact that bank capitalisation is not to be imposed 
externally by regulators but to be determined by a bank in accordance with its own internal 
risk management models and this is subject to the fact that such models are regarded by the 
regulators as being adequate.4 Since the inception of the 1988 Basel Accord, advanced 
internal based regulatory models have been introduced by the Basel Committee in response to 
the flaws which were revealed following the introduction of the 1988 Accord. This paper 
commences with a discussion revolving round the primary objectives of the 1988 Accord and 
provides an insight into developments which triggered a need for the revision of the 1988 
Accord in June 1999 – as demonstrated by the Basel Committee’s issue of its First 
Consultative Paper. As well as facilitating a discussion of the criticisms of the 1988 Accord, 
the section also highlights other factors which instigated the introduction of Basel 2. The 
section which then follows is dedicated to a consideration of reasons for the introduction of 
the Internal Ratings Based Approaches – a consequence of the Second Consultative Paper. 
The remaining sections of the paper will then focus on the Internal Ratings Based approaches 
and the Advanced Measurement Approaches – with particular focus on the various types of 
risks which these approaches have been designed to manage and the reasons attributed to the 
importance of such risks. In arriving at a conclusion, the concluding section of this paper will 
consider the benefits of the advanced measurement approaches, the flaws which appear to 
exist in implementing such approaches, and also other efforts undertaken by the Basel 
Committee to address the inadequacies of the 1988 Accord, as well as its response to a 
changing global financial environment. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Research Fellow, Center For European Law and Politics, University of Bremen. 
2  See F Haines, ‘Regulatory Failures and Regulatory Solutions: A Characteristic Analysis of the Aftermath of 
Disaster’, Law and Social Inquiry (2009) 30 at page 3; also see C Parker The Open Corporation: Effective Self-
Regulation and Democracy 2002 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
3  J Gray and J Hamilton, Implementing Financial Regulation: Theory and Practice (2006) at page 37 
4  ibid  
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The 1988 Basel Accord was adopted as a means of achieving two primary objectives 
5namely:  
ational banking organisations were 
encouraged to supplement their capital positions. 
 To mitigate competitive inequalities 
deration off balance sheet exposures when assessments of capital adequacy are 
ndertaken.7 
apital requirements on reduced risk taking by banks, in 
lation to capital, was also to be undertaken.  
aking were not only 
mited, but also complicated the task of making an evaluation thereof.12 
                                                
 
 
 
 “…..to help strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking 
system.” This would be facilitated where intern
 
 
The framework was not only oriented towards increasing the sensitivity of regulatory capital 
differences in risk profiles which exist within banking organisations, but was also aimed at 
discouraging the retention of liquid, low risk assets.6 Furthermore, it was designed to take into 
express consi
u
 
Ten years following the conclusion of the agreement on the 1988 Accord, a Working Party 
was established to evaluate the impact and achievements of the Basel Accord. Two principal 
issues which were taken into consideration by the Working Party were:8 Firstly, whether 
some banks have been encouraged to hold higher capital ratios than would have been the case 
if the adoption of fixed minimum capital requirements had not occurred and, whether an 
increase in capital or reduction of lending has resulted in any increase in ratios. Secondly, an 
evaluation of the impact of fixed c
re
 
In response to the first issue, relating to whether an introduction of fixed minimum capital 
requirements has led to banks maintaining higher capital ratios, some studies which were 
undertaken, revealed that capital standards, when strictly adhered to, compelled weakly 
capitalised banks to consolidate their capital ratios.9 In response to whether banks adjusted 
their capital ratios to comply with requirements through an increase in capital or a reduction 
of risk-weighted assets, research revealed that banks responded to pressures stemming from 
capital ratios, in a way which they perceived to be most cost effective.10 Results obtained in 
response to an evaluation of the impact of capital requirements on risk taking were 
inconclusive.11The data available for purposes of measuring bank risk t
li
 
Other issues which were difficult to evaluate included whether an introduction of minimum 
capital requirements for banks were detrimental to their competitiveness and whether the 
Basel Accord facilitated competitive inequalities amongst banks.13 These evaluative 
difficulties, respectively, were attributed firstly, to the fact that “long term competitiveness of 
 
5 „Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour: The Impact of the Basle Accord“ Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision Working Papers No 1 April 1999 at page 1 < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp1.pdf?noframes=1> 
(last visited 31 July 2009)  
6 ibid 
7 ibid 
8 ibid 
9 ibid at page 2 
10 ibid at page 3 
11 ibid 
12 ibid 
13 See ibid at page 4 
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banking” depends on a variety of factors – most of which are not connected to regulation and 
secondly, to the available evidence at the time – which was inconclusive and hence, not 
ufficiently persuasive.14 
mendments to the 1988 Accord 
he First Consultative Paper - The Three Pillar Model 
to underlying risks, and to 
cognise the improvements in risk measurement16 and control.” 
 from Basel I was the unwillingness of banks to invest in better risk 
anagement systems.  
apital arbitrage 
appear inflated.21  Four dominant types of capital arbitrage which have been identified are 
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In June 1999, as a means of replacing the 1988 Basel Accord, the first consultative paper (on 
a new capital adequacy framework) was issued by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision. The First Consultative Paper introduced the “three pillar” model which 
comprises of “the minimum capital requirements” – that attempt to consolidate the rules 
established in the 1988 Accord, “supervisory review” and “market discipline” – “as a lever to 
strengthen disclosure and encourage safe and sound banking practices”.15 Whilst 
acknowledging that the 1988 Accord had “helped to strengthen the soundness and stability of 
the international banking system and enhanced competitive equality among internationally 
active banks”, it was added that the new framework provided by the first consultative paper 
was “designed to better align regulatory capital requirements 
re
 
 
One of the flaws inherent in the 1988 Basel Accord was namely, the fact that it rewarded 
risky lending since it required banks to set aside the same amount of capital against loans to 
shaky borrowers as against those with better credits.17 Apart from the fact that capital 
requirements were just reasonably related to bank’s risk taking, the credit exposure 
requirement was the same regardless of the credit rating of the borrower.18 Furthermore, the 
capital requirement for credit exposure often depended on the exposure’s legal form – for 
instance, an on-balance sheet loan was generally subject to a higher capital requirement than 
an off-balance sheet to the same borrower.19 In addition to such insensitivity to risk, another 
problem which resulted
m
 
C
 
A general criticism of Basel I relates to the fact that it promoted capital arbitrage. This is 
attributed to its wide risk categories which provide banks with the liberty to “arbitrage 
between their economic assessment of risk and the regulatory capital requirements.”20 
“Regulatory capital arbitrage” involves the practice by banks of “using securitisation to alter 
the profile of their book” and may produce the effect of making the bank’s capital ratios 
 
14 ibid at pages 4 and 5 
15 See ‚Consultative Paper on a New Capital Adequacy Framework“ June 1999 < 
http://www.bis.org/press/p990603.htm> (last visited 31 July 2009) 
16 See remarks of the chairman of the Task Force on the Future of Capital regulation; ibid 
17  „Basle bust“ The Economist April 13th 2000 
18 M Saidenberg and T Schuermann,‚The New Basel Capital Accord and Questions for Research (2003) Wharton 
Financial Institutions Center Working Paper 2003 at page 4 
19 ibid 
20  ‘Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour: The Impact of the Basel Accord’ Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision Working Papers April 1999 at page 21 
21 ibid; Bank’s capital ratio may appear inflated “relative to the riskiness of the remaining exposure”, see ibid 
 5
namely:22 cherry picking, securitisation with partial recourse, remote origination and indirect 
credit. 
 
Basel II 
 
Some of the key factors which instigated the introduction of Basel 2 include:23 
 
 Changes in the structure of capital markets – resulting in the need for the incorporation 
of increased competitiveness of credit markets in capital requirements 
 The need for measures which would facilitate the eradication of inefficiencies in 
lending markets 
 Explosive debt levels which were generated during the economic upturn 
 
 
Under Basel II, and in response to the fact that the measurement of minimum capital was 
previously based on a general assessment of risk dispersion which did not correspond to 
specific circumstances of individual institutions, credit institutions will be required to retain 
more capital if required. Under Pillar 1, the definition of capital and minimum capital 
coefficient remain unchanged – however, credit institutions will be required to retain more 
capital if their individual risk situation so demands.24 Further advancements under Basel II are 
illustrated in the areas of risk measurements. The measurement methods for credit risk are 
more sophisticated than was previously the case. For the first time, a means of measuring 
operational risk has been set out.25 Under Pillar One, credit and market risk are supplemented 
by operational risk – which is to be corroborated by capital.26 
 
 
Reasons attributed to the focus on credit risk 
 
In several countries, differences which exist between sectors of principal business activities, 
along with risk exposures of such businesses, reflect variations which persist in the rules that 
are applied to various types of businesses.27 To illustrate, whilst balance sheets of individual 
banking institutions vary, generally, lending activities constitute the core of commercial 
banking business, and since loans typically constitute the major part of banks’ assets, the 
dominant risk for banking institutions, is consequently credit risk.28 Liquidity risk and other 
market risks are also connected with day to day activities in commercial banking. 
Furthermore, as illustrated by the recent financial crisis, liquidity risk is also assuming a role 
which is of greater importance than was previously the case. According to Brunnermeier et 
al29 failures such as Northern Rock, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns were triggered not 
only by their inability to transfer their liabilities (funding illiquidity), but also their inability to 
sell mortgage products at “non-fire sale-prices” (market illiquidity). The extent to which the 
                                                 
22 See ibid at pages 22-24 
23  See A Saunders and L Allen, ‘Credit Risk Measurement: New Approaches to Value at Risk and Other 
Paradigms’ Second Edition Wiley Publishers at page 24 
24  See ‘Basel II: Minimum Capital Requirements’ 
http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_basel_saeule1.en.php (last visited 10 August 2009) 
25  See ibid 
26 ibid 
27 ‘Supervision of Financial Services in the OECD Area: Financial groups, financial convergence and prudential 
supervision’ page 4 < http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/27/1939320.pdf> (last visited 3 August 2009) 
28 ibid 
29  See ‘The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation: Geneva Reports on the World Economy 11’, 
Preliminary Draft 2009 at page 36 
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maturity of funding determines the risk of an asset is an important  lesson from the Crash of 
2007/2008.30 Under Basel 2 proposals, the aggregate capital adequacy measurements after 
2005 are to be calculated as a sum of the credit, market and operational risk capital 
requirements.31 
 
 
The Transition to Internal Rate Based Methodologies -  The Second Consultative Paper 
 
In January 2001, the Basel Committee issued the Second Consultative Paper which introduced 
the two Internal Ratings Based (IRB)methodologies, the Foundational IRB and the Advanced 
IRB methodologies. With the internal ratings based approaches introduced under Basel II, 
large banks, through an implementation of their individual credit risk models, will be able to 
derive fundamental inputs for the formulas that will decide the level of capital they must 
retain.32 In facilitating and enabling the implementation of such advanced developed 
techniques for the purposes of carrying out self assessments of risk, Basel II gives greater 
prominence to capital regulation.33 However, the prominence of the Advanced IRB approach 
in the future, will bring about serious consequences where there are limitations in the 
approach.34 Basel 2 accounts for unexpected losses in capital requirements – unlike the 
situation which existed under Basel 1 whereby the market risk amendment only incorporated 
unexpected losses.35  
 
 
Reasons for introducing the IRB approaches 
 
The benefit which an Internal Ratings Based approach was to offer was attributed to the 
increased risk sensitivity generated from its regulatory capital requirements. The IRB 
approaches are consequential of Basel negotiations - unlike regulatory methods and rules 
which are products of international harmonisation and which were adopted from already 
existing systems.36 
 
The Internal Ratings Based approach to capital requirements for credit risk, not only relies 
significantly on the internal assessment carried out by a bank, in relation to counter parties 
and exposures, but is geared towards the achievement of two primary goals.37 These are 
namely, “additional risk sensitivity” and “incentive compatibility.”38  
 
                                                 
30  see ibid at viii 
31 See A Saunders and L Allen, ‘Credit Risk Measurement: New Approaches to Value at Risk and Other 
Paradigms’ Second Edition Wiley Publishers at page 24 
32 See D Tarullo,Banking on Basel: The Future of International Financial Regulation Peterson Institute for 
International Economics at page 6 
33 ibid at page 16 
34 ibid 
35 A Saunders and L Allen, ‘Credit Risk Measurement: New Approaches to Value at Risk and Other Paradigms’ 
Second Edition Wiley Publishers at page 25  
36 D Tarullo,Banking on Basel: The Future of International Financial Regulation Peterson Institute for 
International Economics at page 6 
37 ‘The Internal Ratings Based Approach’, Supporting Document to the New Basel Capital Accord 2001 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca05.pdf (last visited 3 August 2009) at page 1  
38 With respect to „incentive compatibility“, a well- structured IRB approach could stimulate banks to improve 
their internal management practices on a continual basis. ibid 
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Under the original Accord, the first pillar was geared towards the aim of attaining a detailed 
and “risk sensitive treatment” of credit risk.39 In order to improve the alignment of capital 
charges to underlying risk in matters relating to sovereign risks, a proposal was made to 
replace the approach which prevailed at the time with a system which would employ the use 
of external credit assessment in determining risk weightings.40 An amended version of the 
prevailing approach under the 1988 Accord, the implementation of banks’ internal ratings, 
along with portfolio credit risk models were to be used in establishing minimum capital 
requirements.41 Furthermore, the Basel Committee not only acknowledged transactions where 
the 1988 Accord did not promote the implementation of “credit risk mitigation techniques”, 
but also put forward proposals aimed at widening the scope of the Accord to embrace other 
major classes of risks, namely market risk.42 
 
 
Market Risks 
 
The foundational approach for the capital framework for market risk segregates “general 
market risk” from “specific risks” attributed to individual securities.43 An alternative to that 
part of the standardised approach which constitutes general market risk was to be found 
through the establishment of the internal models approach.44 Some scope, however, was 
permitted by the April 1995 Committee Document as a means of designing the components of 
specific risk.45 Furthermore, comments were invited in order to facilitate proposals on how 
specific risk was measured at the time, and how it could be measured for capital purposes.46 
The inherent flaws in banks’ internal models were highlighted in the responses from industry 
participants and such responses revealed that whilst bank’s internal models may account  for 
particular components of specific risk, evidence appeared to corroborate the fact that vital 
components of specific risk (such as event or default risk), were not generally “captured” by 
banks’ internal models.47 Furthermore, the probability of default (PD) of a borrower or class 
of borrowers, the core quantifiable concept which the IRB is founded on, does not present an 
accurate account of potential credit loss.48 The entire specific risk charges of the standardised 
approach are to be imposed on bank models which do not incorporate (partially or wholly) 
specific risks.49 
 
 
                                                 
39 See D Tarullo,Banking on Basel: The Future of International Financial Regulation Peterson Institute for 
International Economics at page 6 
40 ibid 
41 ibid 
42 Interest rate risk in the banking book and other risks such as operational risks, were not expressly addressed at 
the time. See ibid 
43  See ‘Overview of the Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks: The Use of Internal 
Models for Supervisory Purposes/ Treatment of Specific Risks’ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
Committees at the Bank for International Settlement Jan 1996, paragraph 17 http://riskinstitute.ch/BIS.htm (last 
visited 11 August 2009) 
44 ibid 
45 ibid 
46 ibid 
47 See ibid at para 18 
48 The fundamental inputs to the IRB approach comprise of the probability of default (PD), the Loss Given 
Default (LGD) the Exposure at Default (EAD) and the maturity of exposures (M). See Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, Consultative Document, Standard Approach to Credit Risk, Supporting Document to the 
New Basel Accord at page 3 January 2001 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca04.pdf> (last visited 3 August 2009) 
49 ibid at para 19 
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Basel 2 operates according to a three level approach whereby banks are permitted to select 
from three models, namely, the basic standardized model, the IRB foundation approach and 
the advanced ratings approach.50 Whilst the foundational and advanced Internal Ratings 
Based approaches are determined in accordance with banks’ internal ratings, the standardised 
approach is the most simplified of the three approaches.51 Under the standardised approach, 
regulatory capital requirements are more syncronised and in harmony with the principal 
elements of banking risk – owing to the introduction of more differentiated risk weights and a 
broader recognition of techniques which are applied in mitigating risk whilst such techniques 
attempt to avoid undue complexity.52 As a result, capital ratios generated through the 
standardised approach, should adapt more to present and actual risks encountered by banks, 
than was previously the case.53  
 
 
Eligibility requirements for the Internal Ratings Based models 
 
Certain minimum requirements which relate to internal ratings, credit assessments and 
disclosure need to be fulfilled in order for a bank to qualify for an application of the IRB 
approach.54 Furthermore, the eligibility requirements for an internal ratings based model 
imposes obligations on the bank to set up an internal ratings model for purposes of 
compartmentalising the exposure of various lending activities, be they commercial or 
consumer lending, and depending on whether such are on or off balance sheet activities.55 
 
Qualifications aimed at satisfying the demands of the Advanced IRB approach would require 
the fulfilment of supplementary conditions which would apply in exposure calculations where 
the following events occur, namely: default, loss in the event of default and maturity of the 
exposure.56 
 
 
Criticisms of the IRB approaches 
 
Various responses which were received in relation to the Second Consultation Paper 
highlighted the following recurring themes: 57 
 
- Doubts were expressed over the potential of the IRB approach to address capital 
regulation 
- The Committee was criticised over its application of a “scaling factor” which 
multiplied the probability of default value (generated by the bank’s internal system) by 
a factor of around 1.5 
                                                 
50 ibid at page 24 
51 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document, Standard Approach to Credit Risk, 
Supporting Document to the New Basel Accord at page 1 January 2001 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca04.pdf> (last visited 3 August 2009) 
52 ibid 
53 ibid 
54 D Tarullo,Banking on Basel: The Future of International Financial Regulation Peterson Institute for 
International Economics at page 108 
55 A Saunders and L Allen, ‘Credit Risk Measurement: New Approaches to Value at Risk and Other Paradigms’ 
Second Edition Wiley Publishers at page 31 
56 D Tarullo,Banking on Basel: The Future of International Financial Regulation Peterson Institute for 
International Economics at page 108 
57 See ibid at pages 111 and 112 
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- The proposals under the Second Consultation were considered by several 
commentators as “incomplete” in areas which were of significant importance – hence, 
they were incapable of assessing the effects of the Committee’s proposals 
- The most important of these responses focussed on complaints which had been made 
by several banks in relation to increased regulatory capitals under the Second 
Consultative Paper. Reports from November 2001 indicated that levels of regulatory 
capital would rise under the three approaches. The Basel Committee was confronted 
with an embarrassing situation where the aggregate percentage rise for the 
foundational IRB approach was higher in comparison to the moderate drop witnessed 
under the Advanced IRB approach.58 This implied that banks would have little (if any) 
incentive to change from a standardized approach to the foundational approach.59 
Such conflicting results inflicted damage to the Basel Committee’s credibility as the 
results appeared to corroborate the fact that “it did not seem to understand the effects 
of its own proposals”. 
                                                
 
 
In establishing an Internal Ratings Based approach, the Committee’s intention was directed at 
fine tuning capital requirements with a greater degree of accuracy to the level of a bank’s 
exposure to credit risk.60 The IRB approach operates consistently with the system adopted by 
several banks whose risk management systems are capable of making internal assessments in 
matters related to their capital adequacy and risk profiles.61 
 
 
Internal measurements of banks’ credit risk levels are dependent on evaluations of the “risk 
characteristics” which are attributed to the borrower and the particular type of transaction.62 
Many banks align the methodologies of their borrower ratings and risk management practices 
to the risk of borrower default.63 
 
 
 
Operational Risk 
 
Operation is regarded as “the risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from inadequate or failed 
internal processes, people and systems or from external events”64  It is also considered “ the 
danger of a bank sustaining losses resulting from failed internal processes and systems, 
human error or through the impact of external events on banking operations.”65 Focus is 
 
58 Even though the requirement which was proposed for operational risk was to generate an aggregate rise in 
regulatory capital; see ibid 
59 ibid 
60 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document, Standard Approach to Credit Risk, 
Supporting Document to the New Basel Accord at page 3 January 2001 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca04.pdf> (last visited 3 August 2009) 
61 ibid 
62 ibid 
63 ibid 
64 Basel Committee’s definition. Whilst strategic and reputational risks are not included as part of this definition, 
the definition includes legal risk. See Consultative Document on “Operational Risk” January 2001 Bank For 
International Settlements < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca07.pdf> (last visited 6 August 2009) at page 2 
65 See ‘Basel II: AMA Approval procedure’ 
http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_basel_zulassungama.en.php 
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placed by the Basel Committee on the causes of operational risk and this is attributed to the 
needs and demands of risk management and measurement.66 
 
 
Relevance of the three pillars of Basel II to the operational risk capital framework 
 
The three pillars of the New Basel Capital Accord contribute immensely to the operational 
risk framework.67 The Basel Committee’s implementation of rigorous quantitative and 
qualitative standards for measuring and managing risk, which will aid the determination of 
certain capital assessment techniques’ applicability and suitability, in the Committee’s 
opinion, should serve in facilitating the management of operational risk.68 This is illustrated 
under Pillar One where operational risk is to be corroborated by capital. Pillar One minimum 
capital requirements are not only intended by the Committee to be used in the determination 
of the eligibility to apply certain capital assessment techniques, but also considered to be vital 
in the management of operational risk.69 Whilst Pillar Two establishes a framework whereby 
banks are obliged to assess the level of capital required in order to corroborate any risks borne 
by these institutions, which will be reviewed by supervisors, Pillar Three facilitates a process 
whereby banks are subjected to stringent requirements aimed at compelling them to execute 
their business activities efficiently  and securely.70 
 
Measurement approaches for operational risk can be found in the Capital Requirement 
Directive (CRD). There are three wide approaches to capital assessment of operational risk as 
provided by the Basel Committee:71 
 
 Basic Indicator Approach 
 Standardised Approach 
 Internal Measurement Approach 
 
As from 2007, institutions were allowed to select between the Basic Indicator Approach and 
the Standardised Approach, whilst the application of the more sophisticated AMA approach 
was permitted from 2008.72 Implementation of such approaches is subject to approval from 
national supervisors.73 Credit institutions which have not been authorised to implement the 
AMA or which have not filed for an application of the use of the Standardised Approach, will 
be consigned to the use of the Basic Approach.74 
 
 
 
                                                 
66 . See Consultative Document on “Operational Risk” January 2001 Bank For International Settlements < 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca07.pdf> (last visited 6 August 2009) at page 2; Based on the Committee’s review 
of the industry’s progress in measuring operational risk, it acknowledges the need to measure and design 
operational risk at the earliest stages; ibid. 
67 See Consultative Document on “Operational Risk” January 2001 Bank For International Settlements < 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca07.pdf> (last visited 6 August 2009) at page 4 
68 ibid 
69 ibid 
70 ibid 
71 See Consultative Document “Operational Risk” Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Supporting 
Document to the New Basel Capital Accord, January 2001 page 5  http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca07.pdf (last 
visited 1st August 2009) 
72 See ‘Basel II: AMA Approval procedure’ 
http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_basel_zulassungama.en.php 
73  See for example, the case with the German Bank Supervisor, BaFin; ibid 
74 ibid 
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Advanced Measurement Approaches (AMA) 
 
Advanced Measurement Approaches serve as means whereby Basel 2 not only offers a wide 
scope of flexibility to banks in their development of an operational risk management 
framework, but by so doing, recognises the “evolutionary nature” inherent in managing 
operational risk.75 
 
For purposes of applying the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) for operational risk, 
credit institutions are encouraged to submit applications for approval.76 
 
 
Eligibility Requirements for Advanced Measurement Approaches 
 
The bank is required to satisfy general standards,77 qualitative78 and quantitative79 standards. 
 
General Standards 
Minimum requirements to be fulfilled by a bank include: The active involvement by the board 
of directors and senior management, in supervising the framework for operational risk 
management, sound and a credible operational risk management system, and adequate 
resources in operating core business activities and departments relating to control and audit 
functions.80 
 
Furthermore, an initial monitoring period is imposed on a bank, by its supervisor, before it 
can carry out any regulatory activities.81  
 
Qualitative Standards 
 
In relation to qualitative standards, a bank must possess an independent management function 
which is not only capable of designing and implementing the management framework of the 
bank’s operational risk, but also codifying procedures involving operational risk management 
and controls.82 Furthermore, the bank must not only ensure that necessary procedures exist as 
a means of responding to information contained within management reports, but that its 
“operational risk management systems” are “closely integrated into the day-to-day risk 
management processes of the bank”, satisfy the requirements of reporting on a regular basis in 
matters relating to operational risk exposures and “loss experience” and that such risk 
management systems are sufficiently documented .83 
 
 
 
                                                 
75 See ‘ Observed Range of Practice in Key Elements of Advanced Measurement Approaches (AMA)” October 
2006 Bank for International Settlements http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs131.pdf?noframes=1 (last visited 6 August 
2009) 
76 See ‘Basel II: AMA Approval procedure’ 
http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_basel_zulassungama.en.php 
77 See paragraph 664 of the Basel II Accord < http://www.basel-ii-accord.com/BaselText/Basel664to683.htm> 
(last visited 6 August 2009) 
78 see ibid, paragraph 666 
79 See ibid para 667 – with particular reference to the AMA soundness standard 
80 See para 664 
81 ibid para 665 
82  ibid para 666(a) 
83  see ibid at para 666(b) (c) and (d) 
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Conclusion 
 
Basel Committee’s Efforts in Responding to New Forms of Risk and its Evolutionary Nature. 
 
Having considered the progress made by the Basel Committee: In addressing the deficiencies 
of the 1988 Basel Accord, in supplementing credit and market risk with operational risk under 
Pillar One of Basel 2, in imposing stringent requirements on banking and credit institutions 
before the adoption of Internal Ratings Based and Advanced Measurement approaches can 
occur, interalia, criticisms of these sophisticated techniques must also be acknowledged. 
Apart from the fact that such approaches are not well tested, the inability of banks’ internal 
models to effectively incorporate particular elements of specific risks is an issue which the 
Committee acknowledges to be of vital importance.84 Whilst Basel 2 does not cannot account 
for all prevailing financial risks, the regulation of instruments such as hedge funds, which are 
of systemic importance to the financial industry, and the pro cyclical nature of risks, as 
revealed in the recent financial crisis, are areas where work is currently being undertaken. 
This is reflected in proposals which have been put forward by the Financial Stability Forum 
and which include a consolidation of the regulatory capital framework, a revision of Basel II 
framework for market risk and bolstering risk based capital requirements with a measurement 
based which is neither risk based nor complex.85 
 
However, greater focus appears to be required in matters related to the incorporation of risks 
attributed to non bank institutions. As well as highlighting the ineffectiveness of market 
discipline in constraining risk taking outside the banking sector, the recent financial crisis also 
highlighted an underestimation of the systemic importance of some non bank institutions.86 
 
84 The Committee acknowledges that whilst it is willing to accord credit to bank models which are capable of 
incorporating specific risks and also introduce measures aimed at encouraging such methodologies, it is of vital 
importance to have a “prudential cushion” which would deal with how certain components of specific risk could 
be designed. See ‘Overview of the Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks: The Use of 
Internal Models for Supervisory Purposes/ Treatment of Specific Risks’ Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, Committees at the Bank for International Settlement Jan 1996, paragraph 19 
http://riskinstitute.ch/BIS.htm (last visited 11 August 2009 
85 See Commission Staff Working Document accompanying document to the Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, 
securitization issues and remuneration policies, July 2009 
http://ec.europa/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/impact_assessment_en.pdf pages 45 and 46 
86 See also A Carvajal and others ‚ The Perimeter of Financial Regulation’ (2009) SPN/09/07 at page 4 of 17 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2009/spn0907.pdf> 
